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Journal Articles Social Choice and Welfare Year : 2020

On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules

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hal-03092402 , version 1 (17-09-2021)

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Matias Nunez, M. Remzi Sanver. On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules. Social Choice and Welfare, 2020, 56, pp.421-441. ⟨10.1007/s00355-020-01293-9⟩. ⟨hal-03092402⟩
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