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Journal Articles International Game Theory Review Year : 2015

Coalitional ZP-Equilibrium in Games and its Existence

Abstract

We introduce a solution concept for games in normal form with undetermined parameters, coalitional ZP-equilibrium, based on the notions of Z-equilibrium of [Zhukovskii and Chikrii [1994] Linear quadratic differential games, Kiev, Naoukova Doumka] and ZS-equilibrium of [Larbani and Lebbah [1999] A concept of equilibrium for a game under uncertainity. Europ. J. Oper. Res. 117, 145-156]. For each coalition structure, ZP-equilibrium ensures both the stability of the partition and equilibrium of coalitional strategies (in Pareto sense). We show that under some quasiconcavity conditions on payoff functions, the coalitional ZP-equilibrium exists in compact, convex and continuous normal form games involving undetermined parameters.

Dates and versions

hal-01239782 , version 1 (08-12-2015)

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Cite

Rabia Nessah, M. Larbani, T. Tazdaït. Coalitional ZP-Equilibrium in Games and its Existence. International Game Theory Review, 2015, 17 (3), ⟨10.1142/s0219198915500024⟩. ⟨hal-01239782⟩
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