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Journal Articles Revue Economique Year : 2008

Climate agreement: Concesions and ratifications [Accord climatique Concessions et ratifications]

Abstract

We consider a bargaining game aiming at the full ratification of a climate treaty. Three distinct coalitions are considered: a pro-regime coalition, the so-called Kyoto group, an anti-regime coalition made of the countries rejecting the Kyoto protocol and the G77 coalition made of developing countries. We assume that the pro-regime coalition wants to ratify the treaty as uch while the two other coalitions condition ratification to further concesions. Employing an alternating offers model, we study the concession the pro-regime coalition should make for the others to acept ratify the treaty. We show that the more binding is the ratification constraint of the pro-regime coalition, the lowest is the concesion. Conversely, the more binding the ratification constraints of the two adverse coalitions, the highest should be the concession.
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Dates and versions

hal-00716360 , version 1 (10-07-2012)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-00716360 , version 1

Cite

P. Courtois, Tarik Tazdaït. Climate agreement: Concesions and ratifications [Accord climatique Concessions et ratifications]. Revue Economique, 2008, 59 (4), pp.719-735. ⟨hal-00716360⟩
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